Caroline Thanh Hương
Thưa quí độc giả và bằng hữu,
Gần đây chúng tôi nhận được bản tin về những câu hỏi khẩn
thiết của Nhà giáo Trần thị Lam, người đã làm bài thơ làm rúng động Hà Nội và được
cả triệu lượt người đọc trên Facebook. Các các câu hỏi của Cô, thế hệ trẻ Việt
Nam ở trong nước và ở hải ngoại cần biết và cần những câu trả lời thích đáng.
Giao sư Tiến sĩ Mai Thanh Triết đã có những câu trả lời
ngắn nhưng chính xác. Riêng
câu hỏi thứ 4, theo TS. Triết, thì chưa có một tài liệu
nào viết về chuyện này. Thực ra thì đã co một tài liệu viết bằng Anh ngữ cách
đây 20 năm. Nhưng ở thời điểm đó các mạng internets chưa mở rộng nên chưa có dịp
đăng tải.
"Nên Kinh tế Thị trường Định hướng Xã hội Chủ
nghĩa" của CSVN là rập khuôn chủ trương kinh tế đổi mới của Đặng Tiểu
Bình, Cộng sản Trung Quốc.
Xin nhớ lại, sau khi Hoa Kỳ bỏ bạn Đồng Minh Nam Việt Nam
bằng Hiệp ước Paris
tháng 1/1973 và ngày 30/4/1975 Saigon sụp đổ. Sau khi thống
nhất hai miền Bắc, Nam, Đảng CSVN đã tức tốc áp dụng chính sách tàn độc nhổ cỏ
tận gốc và phế bỏ tất cả tàn dư của thể chế nhân bản, tự do của Miền Nam, giam
cầm toàn bộ sĩ quan của QLVNCH, Cảnh sát, lãnh tụ tôn giáo, đảng phái quốc gia
và giới tri thức, báo chí, nhà văn, nhà báo, kể cả nhà giáo. Đốt sách, cấm chợ,
đánh tư sản mai bản, tịch thu hầu hết xi nghiệp sản xuất và cơ sở thương mại tư
nhân, đổi tiền, bần cùng hoá toàn dân Miên Nam và thiết lập nền mống xã hội chủ
nghĩa rập khuôn Liên Sô từ hạ tầng
cơ sở nông thôn đến thị thành với hệ thống "Mậu dịch
quốc doanh". Kết quả la hàng
chục triệu người mất công ăn việc làm và lâm vào
hoàn cảnh sống dỡ, chết dỡ. Hàng triệu gia đình thuộc giới cao và trung lưu phải
bị lưu đày đói no ở các khu kinh tế mới. Trong khi đó, các lãnh tụ đảng CSVN
tham lam và mù quáng, xua quân xâm chiếm
Cao Miên, gây cuộc chiến đẫm máu với Cộng Sản Trung Quốc,
làm cho nền kinh tế nghèo nàn xã hội chủ nghĩa càng thêm kiệt quệ...
Thay đổi kinh tế, phá bỏ hệ thống quốc doanh thay bằng hệ thống kinh tế thị trường
theo lối của Trung Cộng là tất nhiên... Nhưng ngụy biện là sách lược chính của
Đảng CSVN.
Xin mời đọc cả hai tài liệu dưới đây. Tuy đã viết trên
hai thập kỷ, nhưng các bài viết này vẫn giữ được giá trị thời sự đang tiếp diễn.
Và những ước tính về một tương lai đen tối của Việt Nam dưới chế độ cộng sản
toàn trị, từ hai mươi năm trước, đã diễn ra như một hiện thực đau lòng hiện nay
làm cho cả một dân tộc đang lâm vào cảnh khốn cùng thật bi đát.
Chiếc đầu tàu CSVN đang đưa đất nước vào vực thẳm, nếu
không có một phép lạ như một thiên cơ huyền bí cứu vãn thì cái họa mất nước khó
mà tránh khỏi. Thiên cơ ai mà lường trước được?.. Nhưng phép lạ thường diễn
ra.
Xin mời đọc một bài viết về một khúc quanh của lịch sử
Việt Nam sau chiến tranh dưới đây.
BÀI 1:
TRANSITION FROM SOCIALISM TO
MARKET ECONOMY IN VIETNAM
(VAN NGUYEN DUONG, Feb. 1997)
****
Over the past two decades, Asian
countries in the Pacific rim have developed at an accelerate space, so much so
that the world has marveled at their transformation. According to
official statistics, the economic growth rate of the most countries in this
region exceeds the rest of the world by a large margin. The Socialist Republic
of Vietnam (SRV) is the one of the few exceptions.
The Vietnamese people, as well as
their political friends and economic neighbors, all share an interest in
turning Vietnam in to a free, peaceful and prosperous country. But is there any
chance for the country join the rest of the region on the road to development?
The answer was yes, especially after the United States of America lifted its
embargo against Vietnam in March 1994. However, the obstinate aptitude of
the communist Party of Vietnam's leaders and their limited reform policies
since 1986 have been the main obstacles of the country's modernization.
After a decade of observing the economic
reform in Vietnam, the majority of the world economic experts and political
analysts predict that their will be no economic modernization in Vietnam. Nor
will the nation have prosperity without freedom and democracy. Although many of
them admit that Vietnam, in the past ten years, had made a number steps in its
movement from Socialist economy to Market economy. Experts argue that the issue
is still fundamental unchanged since the Communist leaders are neither able to
solve the pretty of the mass of Vietnamese people nor capable of assuring the
future destiny of the country. The Communist leaders in Vietnam believe that
their "economic renovation" is an ideal "socialist-oriented
economy", which brings modernization to the nation and prosperity to the people.
On the contrary, many Vietnamese intellectuals in exile deny this argument.
They accuse Hanoi-leaders of "trying to consolidate the devastated
Communist regime in Vietnam while attempting to exploit its geopolitic position
in Asia-Pacific and its human and natural resources for their own greed of
wealth, prosperity and power. Their economic reforms set up a new class of
Red-Capitalists in Vietnam.
In reality, the economic reforms in
Vietnam are very complicate and comprehensive. It is not the purpose of this
paper to discuss these controversial arguments, but the purpose is to assess
Vietnam's chances in joining the Asian economic matters for a viable economic
reform and development.
I.-Overview of the
Vietnam Situation after the war-end in April 1975.
11.- Economic reforms in Vietnam, an issue has two faces.
Before discussing economic
reforms in Vietnam, recognition of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV), or the
Worker Party, most critical principle is essential. It is a principle that
governs all activities in the government, in the nation, and within the party
itself. This principle is that all official statements and documents, such as
political announcements, economic statistics, reports, books, press releases,
news, comments, and even laws, have been formulated, regulated and circulated
as propaganda for the interests of the CPV and its leaders alone. These
statements and documents are not true but paradoxical.
"Paradox" therefore is the standard and is applied throughout
the regime's hierarchy from highest to lowest levels as the communist
principle. Any violations of this principle by any party's echelons or lower
grades are condemned of "anti-regime". Consequently, paradox under
Vietnamese Communist regime means to exaggerate, lie, or falsify official
and unofficial information which is covered under demagogic words and
numbers. "Paradox" practices are followed especially in
political reports and economic statistics. The highest degree of CPV's paradox
can be defined as " an issue has two faces, one is superficial and the
other is hidden."
It is hard to understand the true
causes and effects of the economic reforms in Vietnam if we do not recognize
the CPV's paradox. Indeed, the party' s paradox was visible during the Vietnam
War and from 1979 period of Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. Recently, the
CPV published an official economic book written by Đặng Đức Đàm, a member
of the Central Committee of the Party and an economist. This
economic book is titled "Vietnam's Economy 1986-1995". This book has
been considered by many international economic observers as an exaggerative
political and economical document. However, the economic statistic of the book
will be used in this essay to continue to assess Vietnam's economic reform
chances.
12.- Vietnam during the period 1975-1985.
a.- The Vietnam War and its Aftermath:
In 1975, the Hanoi-leaders and the
CPV successfully violated the Paris Accords of 1973 by attacking and occupying
of South Vietnam and unified the country; Vietnam came totally under he
Communist regime itch political, economical, military ladministration structure
not unlike that of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). It
seems that every one in the nation was working for the people. This regime
created a mechanism that possibly submerge the country more deeply into the
Pacific.
Reflecting back to the 1960's,
Vietnam was at the same level of economic development as that of Taiwan,
Singapore, or South Korea. A war and three decades later, Vietnam has
become one of poorest countries in the world, while Taiwan, Singapore and South
Korea have become Giants in the Pacific Rim.
A series of critical issues have
greatly influenced the economic destiny of Vietnam. The first issue is the
backwardness of leadership. The evolution of Vietnam needs creative leadership,
but the Vietnamese statement bury themselves in the ideology of "socialist
revolution" of the past first decade of this century. It is difficult for
the CPV leaders to recognize how this ideology has become, especially since the
universal trend is moving toward economic integration and cooperation. Under
the pressure of international events, Hanoi-leaders have gone from an extreme
to another. Sometimes they adopted an attitude of self isolation and called it
"independence", boasting that they represent "the human supreme
mind". Sometimes they mobilized the whole nation to achieve
"international duties", copying the most minute details of the
"Stalinist model" while regarding other countries as enemy. The
backwardness of the leadership in Vietnam impeded the economic development in
society and pushed the whole country towards a course of collapse.
The second issue is the extreme
poverty of people. As a matter of fact, the war has devastated the whole
country from the North to the South and from the cities to the rice fields.
Several economic indicators such as partial starvation in the northern and
central provinces, poor crops' production, population increases, the high level
of unemployment and underemployment, the high rate of inflation and deficits,
chaotic distribution, and the low level of life expectancy. Among the basic
issues facing Vietnam during the period 1975-1985, poverty was the most
apparent and devastating.
The third issue is the deterioration
of the resources and potentials. The national resources under the
Vietnamese communist regime have severely misused to the point of wasting away
the tremendous reservoir resources and resourceful people. first concern is the
country's youth. The youth generation is not ready to assume the role of the
future generations upon which the the nation relies to rebuild. Statistics
provided by an issue of the Nhan Dan Daily ((The People Daily of the CPV) in
1990 gave an alarming note on the disorientation and the lack of will of the
Vietnamese youth. They have been victims of the educational, economic, and
political systems in Vietnam creating a serious problem of limited future human
resources. Second concern is natural resources. Natural resources have been
exhaustively and disorderly exploited. This has created a tremendous
threat on ecology and severely decreased the living conditions. The already
limited resources ưere mostly wasted rather used. Theft of equipments and
parts, and dilapidation of national assets were common practices. Last but not
least, the national assets suffered great losses in important fields of
cultural heritage and intellectual knowledge. This was the result of propaganda
and one-way information. The Vietnamese intellectuals became more and more worn
down such that the people seldom dare to think differently than that the
official line on everything in life.
There are more issues, but the most
important one which has retarded the Vietnamese people's ability to rebuild
their country was the ambitious outcomes of war by the CPV-leaders in Cambodia.
b.- The Vietnamese Occupation of Cambodia and the Sino-Vietnamese War.
The period of 1976-1980 was presumed
to a period that Hanoi-leaders would take the opportunity to rebuild their
country and to improve the living standard of their people so that they would
be rid of poverty and sufferings they had previously encountered.
Unfortunately, under the Communist regime, everything is decided by the CPV and
not the true, actual requirements of the people.
At the end of 1977, Hanoi-leaders
committed an act which effectively erased all the trust of neighboring
countries. The countries of ASEAN and around the world could not believe that
Hanoi would decide to bring the country into war again by moving troops across
the Cambodian borders and occupying Cambodia. The Vietnamese occupation of
Cambodia r became the main cause of the war with the People's Republic of
China. On February 17, 1979 in order "to teach Vietnam a lesson"
China launched 200,000 troops, 1,200 tanks through Vietnamese borders and
attacked Vietnamese troops in their territories after Hanoi had strengthened
its invasion forces to occupy Phnom Penh in January 15 ( The Harper
Encyclopedia of Military History, p. 1525).
Hanoi-leaders did nothing to
solve their own problems within Vietnam by dragging them into war. On the
contrary, it created even more internal and economic adversities for Vietnam.
People were drafted in order to reinforce the occupation army in Cambodia and
the armies in the north border. More budget had allocated for military and huge
police army which was used to control segments of the population. Though aid
was provided by the USSR and some Eastern poured aid European
countries, unfortunately Vietnam had in exchange to relinquish some of its
sovereignty. The CPV agreed to the USSR setting up the naval base and air base
in Cam-Ranh Bay and Danang, in the interest of Soviet strategy.
After decades of continuous
conflicts with millions of people engaged long term fighting and any budget
fund mainly devoted to the war efforts, normalcy seemed to exclude the notion
of peace. After 1975 any attempt to rebuild the country was abolished by the
CPV' s leaders themselves.
II.- Economic Reforms in Vietnam from
1986-1999.
21.- Causes:
Vietnam's economy was greatly damage
by the reduction of Soviet's economic support, withdrawn in the early 1980's,
especially under Gorbachov's Administration from 1985 onward. For years, the
leadership in Hanoi had pursued a pro-Soviet policy and had opposed China, both
before and after the Sino- Vietnamese War in 1979. To reward such loyalty, the
Soviet and its allies in Eastern Europe poured aid into Vietnam. This economic
aid was estimated at about 1.5 billion dollars a year from the Soviet Unions
alone. Unfortunately, when it was cut, Vietnam's economy collapsed.
As known as for 21 years, American
aid had played a major role in the economic well-being of the people of the
South Vietnam and their modernization efforts. In 1975, this came to an abrupt
end. Four years later, in the wake of Hanoi's invasion of Cambodia and the
resulting ineffective war, China cancelled nearly 100 aid projects to Vietnam.
With this, Vietnam lost its last source of reconstruction assistance.
In addition, Vietnam's foreign deb
was overwhelming. According to Nguyễn văn Linh, the former Secretary General of
the CPV, during a report broadcasted by Hanoi radio on November 8th, 1986, the
total amount of Vietnam-Soviet debt come to 15 billion routes, which converted
to 8.4 billion dollars. To overcome this extra debt to Russia would add an
extra burden to the country which already was in arrears with many other
countries of the world.
The economic stringencies faced by
Hanoi government during the 1975-1985 period were massive. Insufficient budget
for administration needs, excessive rinsing debts, cut off in financial aid by
Soviet Unions, internal economic unrest, maintaining over 1,500,000
troops, all created more problems for Hanoi-leaders. The government was forced
to export labor overseas to pay off foreign debts, to use the Cambodian
conflicts as an economic exchange.
The economic policies in Vietnam
were changed whether the CPV want it or not. It became a matter of
survival in order to save the regime.
However, according to the official
media of the regime, the "economic renovation" (Đổi Mới Kinh tế) was
not changed, a reform of economy, nor a transition from Socialism to Market
Economy. For years, Hanoi has denied the fact that the CPV leaders were forced
to change their economic policies. Officially, they stated that the
"revocation" was part of the inner reasons of the CPV's
ideology. In fact, in "Vietnam's Economy 1985-1995", Đặng Đức Đàm has
written these forewords: "Economic Renovation in Vietnam started in the
late 1970's and early 1980's. Yet until 1986 it was basically carried out
within the centralized planning mechanism, with policies designed to improve
and readjust it, rather than replace it with the Market Mechanism."
In reading the foreword of his
economic book, one might have the impression that the economic reforms in
Vietnam was truly a "national development of the Communist economy. In
addition, it appears that "Economic Renovation" was a basic
thinking of Socialism or Communism !.. As Đặng confirmed father in the
book , "The basic content of the policy of promoting a multi-sector
economy to a socialist-oriented, multi-sector one in which the state plays a
leading role." (P.20, Vietnam's Economy 1986-1995, Thế Giới Publishers,
Hanoi 1995, Đặng Đức Đàm). This explanation of Đặng was a big lie or a
propaganda catchphrase. Đặng is really a true communist leader, like others,
who always labeled the CPV as the "Creator".
22.- Reforms' Processes during the
Period 1986-1990.
In 1986, the Sixth Convention of the
CPV chose Nguyễn văn Linh as Secretary General of the Party.
The "economic renovation" started immediately based on the Sixth
Convention Congress Decision of the following key tenets: "The policy
regarding a multi-sector economy is of long term strategy significance; it
bears the character of a law governing the passage from small production to a
large-scale socialist production, it reflects a democratic spirit in economics,
it ensures for everybody the possibility of earning his or her live hood in
keeping with the law (Đặng Đức Đam 1995, pp 19-20).
In reality, the partial economic
liberalization of Vietnam was in response to the rapid deterioration of the
economic situation and the pressure of the Soviet Unions. Three main programs
were launched to: increase food production, increase production of consumer
goods, and increase exports.
To implement these
economic programs the following economic measures were introduced:
a.- In Agriculture: the gradual
dissolution of the collective farms with the land and agricultural implements
being returned to the farmers who will hold the land under long term lease (up
to 15 years); replacement of the rice quota and the force sale of rice to
government agencies by a system of agricultural tax which farmers can pay
either in kind or in cash; and allowing private traders to buy rice and other
agricultural products.
b. - In Industry and Services:
opening up almost all sectors previously reserved to public enterprises to
private activities and lowering the level of state support to public
enterprises together with abolishing price controls and the systems of dual
prices. Weakening the central system of economic planning with the individual
government enterprises now being responsible for both their supplies and sale.
Individual enterprises however are required to contribute to the budget an
amount commensurate with their activities.
c.- In Finance: establishing of a
two-echelon banking system which regulates the national finances in accordance
with the practice of the market economy, increasing the interest on deposit;
and allowing a system of private credit cooperative to attract saving.
d.- In Foreign Investment: passing a
law for foreign investment opening up the country for foreign investors.
(Đăng, 1995, pp. 38-48).
By mid 1989, these steps and measures
of good timing succeeded in halting inflation, which stood at 4% a month, and
turned around in agricultural production. However, as the end of 1990, the
situation rapidly deteriorated when President Gorbachov of Russia announced his
"Unilateral Convention Force Reduction" and withdrew Russian navy
force from Cam-Ranh Bay, and decreased 80% of Russia's aid to VietNam. There
were serious reductions or delay in the supply of refined oil products and
fertilizers. Without fertilizer and fuel the rhythmic activities of
agricultural production could not be maintained.
Meanwhile, a financial scandal
developed due to the lack of regulation and control . The need to keep
inflation at a manageable dimension by cutting down the budget deficit had
forced the Vietnamese government to cancel many vital projects needed to increase
the control's productive capacity.
As for Western investment, according
to the Vietnam official figures, a total of 105 permits had been issued to
foreign companies wishing to invest some 852 million dollars with about half of
the fund to be in the field of oil exploitation. In announcing the above, the
Nhân Dân Daily, March 12, 1990 also said none of these projects "serves
the food production and infrastructure construction beside
telecommunications. Moreover, 75% of these projects are located in the
Southern provinces." Whatever, the explanation might be, nobody knew for
sure how many projects had been approved by the CPV's Politburo and how many
projects had been implement during the first five-year plan 1986-1990.
In trying to attract foreign
investment, Hanoi has made a particular effort to invite international banks to
set shop in Vietnam. Banking officials from France, The United Kingdom,
Australia, Japan, Indonesia are known to have visited Hanoi and Saigon (then
changed the name into Ho Ci Minh City) in 1989, but nothing has come out of
these visits until the United States lifted its trade embargo against Vietnam
in the third month of 1994. Most of impediment can, therefore, be traced to the
CPV's own ineptitude. Even at the best times, CPV' s leaders did not seem to
know how to achieve it. They have continuously baulked at the myriads of
problems that come with any project. They have continuously demonstrated
unresolved doubts about what to do, which resulted in delays that no investors
could tolerate.
As a matter of fact, the first
five-year plan of the CPV's "socialist-oriented economy" has failed.
Besides, there were even more factors that impeded the economic reforms in
Vietnam during the period 1986-1990.
III.- Effects and Weaknesses
Many analysts have observed that the
main factors that have impeded the "economic renovation" in Vietnam
during the period 1986-1990 were: political uncertainties, the lack of environment
for business, bureaucratic difficulties, the finance systems. And the poorness
of the infrastructure especially transport, communications, and power
generation (Lê Mạnh Hùng, Vietnam Perspective, International Conference 1990,
Honolulu, Hawaii).
31.- In Political Domain: The Cambodian
conflict had brought Vietnam downhill even more. The hope of developing
the country by inviting investment had not been successful even though Vietnam
has a lot of valuable resources. Unfortunately, the investors have been
no confidence in Vietnam future since there were many obstacles such as
political incertitude of Hanoi leadership, bureaucratized cadres, and
troublesome corruption of government's officials of all levels.
32.- In Economic Domain: The Sixth
CPV's Politburo Resolution has drafted to read: "the strategy of the
renovation is to concentrate on rural areas, territorial waters, and
mountainous and hilly areas; to pay great attention to rural industries; to
build up a new countryside..." ( Đặng, 1995, p.14). In contrary, the
application of the economic reforms had shown a different direction; it
concentrated on the reconstruction and the development of urban areas.The
reconstruction in rural areas was neglected. As a result, Đặng described the
situation as "in 1986 and 1987, agricultural production again showed signs
of decline, with danger of possible recurrent stagnation. During the lean
months of 19888, 9.3 million people in 21 provinces didn't have enough food.
And in many other places, the peasants were no longer attached to the
land" (Đặng, p. 55). In reality, it was the time of starvation. In
Thanh Hoa Province alone (South part of North Vietnam) tens of thousands of
villagers became beggars causing the proud Socialist Republic of Vietnam regime
to call for international food assistance. However, the various donors of
the time were not convinced that their aid would really reaching the hands of
Vietnamese people.
In industry, Đặng elaborated
on the period of 1986-1990 by simply saying: "for Vietnamese industry, the
period of low growth, that is 1990 and the years preceding it." (p. 85). Đặng's
figures reveal total private enterprises to be 920 in 1985 with a large drop to
770 in 1990 (p.180). In five years, the private enterprises decreased by
150 units , or 17%, essentially revealed the failure of the "economic
renovation". Especially, the number of private enterprises in food
production and food stuff had gravely decreased from 320 to 223 units, 36%, and
from 246 to 130 units, 46%, respectively. However, the private
enterprises in material construction had augmented from 64 to 131 units,
or 51%. The CPV's leaders ignored the consummation of food of the
Vietnamese mass but took care of the living condition of their party's cadres.
These figures gives us a more example of the CPV' s paradox.
The fact is, during this period of
time, about fifty percent of "State Enterprises" have been
transformed into "Private Enterprises" with full CPV' s cadres
control covered under the paradoxical name "private owners" ( in the
ensuing five-year plan the percentage have gradually increased). This means,
with some CPV' s resolutions and and government' s degrees issued, Hanoi
leaders have officially plunged the national assets without guilt and
shameless. These private owners --all were family members or relatives of CPV'
leaders from the Central Committee to the Politburo-- have received more funds
subsidized from National Bank than other State enterprises. They have full
liberty to manage their "new businesses" without any control of the
Party except for the secret promise of sharing the benefits reasonably between
themselves. This economical paradox should be recognized to comprehend
how the "socialist oriented economy", or the "economic
renovation" in Vietnam, during its course of implement, has led the
Communist leaders and cadres to become "Red Capitalists"...
The failure of the "economic
renovation" during the period 1986-1990 was even more apparent by trade
deficits as follows: in 1986, deficit of 627 million US dollars; in 1987, 524
million; and in 1988, 625 million (Lê Mạnh Hùng, International Convention
ơn December 6 & 7, 1990 in Honolulu, Hawaii). The national debts increased
gravely but the CPV 's leaders and cadres were more richer and richer year
after year.
IV.- Progresses
of the Economic Reforms, Period 1991-1995.
In 1991, real changes started when
the Communist Party's Seventh Convention has replaced Nguyễn văn Linh by Đỗ Mười
as Secretary General of the Party and assigned Võ văn Kiệt as Prime
Minister of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam's Government. These decisions
were viewed as a big step for the economic reforms. Võ văn Kiệt was a
Southern-born intellectual and became the real salvation of the CPV, it's
regime and its economic renovation which was in critical situation in 1990.
Kiệt was a liberal power that helped to open the door to the new concept
of diplomacy and economy from the region and the world. But the most important
factors that assisted in the growth of the Vietnamese economy included:
41.- Vietnam, under the pressure of
the United Nations, withdrew its troops from Cambodia in 1990-1991
42. - The United States lifted its
trade embargo against Vietnam in early March 1994.
43.- World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) began to help Vietnam to rebuild its national
economy. While, the political and economic tumble of the Communism in
Europe and the collapse of the USSR left Vietnam
without financial friends and allies, therefore, the CPV was obliged
to open to the capitalist world, at least in the economic matter.
In reality, it is significant that
the reaction projected by Hanoi-leaders to the changes occurring in the Western
European countries was not one of being particularly overjoyed.
On the contrary, they were quite worried that the events
in these countries might set an example, causing similar changes in Vietnam as
well. This was a clear sign that the Hanoi-leaders clung to the Socialist
Communism doctrine rather than welcome any changes, except economic change.
International analysts labeled this Vietnam phenomenon as a "lame
horse" or "half-way reform". Some economic reforms might
temporarily help the regime but will not grant the long term prosperity for the
Vietnamese people.
So far, the economic reforms have had
limited results. At the end 1995, the country counted more than 25, 000
undertakings had been started including: state enterprises, joint-stock
companies, limited liability companies, and private enterprises. The most
visible progresses were observed four areas: agriculture, industry, services,
and investments.
In general, over recent years, under the Võ
văn Kiệt Administration, industrial production in Vietnam had achieved fairly
growth rates which were relatively similar in most branches. in 1994, total
output value increased 14% compared with previous years.
State-owned enterprises continued to hold a leading position in
high-tech/capital-intensive industries. However, non-state enterprises
had been increased from 770 units in 1990 to 4,212 in 1993 and to 18, 697 in
1994. More than 50% of these enterprises had an average of fixed assets of more
than 500 million đồng (Vietnamese basic-currency), which was about 1 million US
dollars at the time and an average of floating capital of more than 260 million
đồng. About 100 units had a fixed assets from 1 to 2 billion đồng. Their
activities were mainly concentrated in commerce and industry. "Some
of them are former state enterprises endowed with material and technological
installations, good management and qualified employees," said Đặng
(pp.24-25).
44.- Foreign investment and Trades:
To meet the demand of capital for economic development, Võ văn Kiệt
Administration had encouraged foreign direct investment (FDI) and direct
investment through development credit. In general, funds and capitals were
coming from foreign investment and loans from the community of international
financial organizations such as World Bank, IMF, and Bank of Asia. the
evolution towards an open economy in Vietnam was becoming more and more in
evidence since international trades had been emerged since 1994.
a.- Foreign investment: Since
the execution of new law, foreign investments and joint venture
increased considerably. In 1994, investment licenses totaled to nearly 4
billion US dollars, a 50% rise above 1993, that created new jobs for 650
thousand people, and hidden jobs for another 100 thousand. Also in 1994 there
were 214 projects investing in the fields on industry, such as oil and gas and
material construction with an annual of 44% increase, 36 projects
investing in tourism and hotels reached 25% of the total capital invested.
Taiwan was the leading investing country with more than 180 projects and nearly
2 billion US dollars invested; Hong Kong was second with 170 projects with a
total of 1.7 billion US dollars; followed by Singapore, South Korea, and Japan.
Since the lifting of US trade embargo against
Vietnam (March 1994), relations between Vietnam and economic organizations of
the United States and the European countries moved ahead. American companies
total investment increased up to 2.7 billion US dollars. The investment
level of Western and Northern European countries has grown considerably (Đặng,
pp.46-48).
b.- Improvement of International
Trades: Basically, the activities of external economy in the recent past
were realized in accordance with the Prime Minister Võ văn Kiệt and his
administration's team economic-plan, which based on the "open
market", instead of the CPV Politburo's policy. Generally, Vietnam
external economy has taken remarkable steps in development of space,
depth, and expansion. Specialized exports imports enterprises whether
private or State-owned have the equal right of direct export of their
products to foreign markets, and to import raw materials and machines for
their businesses. Therefore, imports and exports really created advantages for
businesses and truly stimulated exports.
In summary, at the end of the second
five-year plan of 1991-1995, Vietnam began achieve stabilization and
growth. Conditions have been formulated for a brighter economy in the future.
However, history of economic development in Vietnam under the socialist regime
has proved otherwise...
V.- Outcomes:
The transition from Socialism
to Market Economy in Vietnam under Võ văn Kiệt Administration has made great
progresses to help the economic development of the country and perhaps it has
promised better better living conditions for the people. However, many
politicians in the world have observed that the recent upheaval in Eastern
Europe hardened the Hanoi's dogmatism. Therefore, in their economic openness
they did not hide the desire to have "capitalist money" poured in to
revamp their "socialist regime". But when Võ văn Kiệt and his
administration's team succeeded in allowing an "open market" to
exist, political-struggle within the Vietnamese Communist Regime surfaced.
Conflicts have spread among top
leaders of the CPV, especially between conservatives ( pro-China, such as Lê Đức
Anh, State President; Đỗ Mười, CPV's Secretary General) and liberal (
pro-Western capitalist countries, such as Võ văn Kiệt, Prime Minister; Phan văn
Khải, First Vice Prime Minister). Conflicts also spread widely among top
communist cadres like those between the North and the South and/or between
young liberal technocrats, professional experts and conservative old leaders
from all levels. The Herald International Tribune on July 3rd, 1996 summarized
the situation as "the conflicts of power in Vietnam is not the split
between conservatives and liberals among the CPV 's leaders on economic
reforms, but on the split of power between the Politburo of the Party and the
Government Administration." Indeed, when Võ văn Kiệt seized the
Administration power, the Politburo could not control the activities of Kiệt's
cabinet members. That became a contradiction of the communist dictatorial
system of governance.
The resulting conflicts squared off
the Party-seized powers and Administration-seized powers and a dozen of top
leaders of both sides were elimination or killed before the Party's VIII
Convention. Finally, during that Convention held in early June 1996, three
important decisions had been issued. In view of which there were three
consequences as in the followings:
51).-The aging leadership in Hanoi
still held their positions (Lê Đức Anh, Đỗ Mười and Võ văn Kiệt). It means the
power-conflict would continue.
52).-A new "Political Permanent
Committee" of the CPV composed of five top leaders will decide all the
nation's activities including the national economic reforms. These five members
were Đỗ Mười, Lê Đức Anh, Võ văn Kiệt, and two new facesGeneral Lê Khả Phiêu
-President of the CPV's Military Committee- and Nguyễn Tấn Dũng -Vice Minister
of Interior. Among them, three were conservatives with Kiệt and Dung as
liberals from the South. It means that the Government Administrative
branch cannot carry out its dogmatic function with such power as in the
preceding years. As a result, the total power will be returned to the Party.
53.- A "political
committee" of employees will be reorganized in any size enterprises. In
any fields, including foreign investment and joint venture's enterprises . It
means the CPV will attempt to regain its power of the national business in the
near future (Ngày Nay Vietnamese Journal, July 16th 1996).
These decisions would restrict and greatly
impede the development of the economic reforms again by deterring any
other foreign investors in Vietnam. Therefore, nobody knows the future of
Vietnam, politically and economically.
In a like manner, international
observers have recognized that, after ten years of economic reforms , Vietnam
has "produced" more than twenty of new "red capitalists",
each owned from 1. to 1.5 billion US dollars and about 2,000 other new
capitalists, each possessed from 80 to 100 million UD dollars. Their property
and assets have been distributed in Vietnam, Asia, and Europe with funds
deposited in international banks. They used their privileged Communist Party
and administration's positions to enrich themselves and drain national
resources by doing legal business under covered of the "private
enterprises", by engaging in the black markets, through corruption and
peculation. In the cities, relatives of those in top party cadres have used
their influence for private gain. In rural areas collective farms were dismantled
and local officials became the-backbone of the new "rural bourgeoisies
(Hawaii news, Vietnamese bimonthly, Dec.15, 1996; p.33).
So "the savage capitalism that
operates under the cloak of a socialist market economy is ushering in more intensive
form of explosion, greater alienation, enormous gaps between rich and poor, and
growing economic and social differences between town and countryside,"
said Maurice Meisner, professor of history at University of Wisconsin (Business
Week , January 13, 1997; p.18).
Moreover, the deteriorating
relationship between the people and its government will eliminate the notion of
State and Nation. The bond and trust necessary for the normal societal
functioning have evaporated. Consequently, the sense of community once
characterizing Vietnamese society has faded away, replaced by selfish interests
and short-sighted economic decisions. This mentality will have a long
lasting effect on the grassroots people of Vietnam and hinder any revival
economic efforts.
Some have argued that economic
modernization will likely lead to political democracy, but others do not
believe so, for there is no economic modernization without freedom and
democracy. For this reason, the prerequisite conditions for any amelioration of
the situation in Vietnam are basic changes in politics. First of all, there
must be an end to the communist monopoly. Political democracy must be restored
as right of everyone.
Conclusion:
Once the dictatorship,
proletarian or whatsoever, is abolished the new political spirit will allow
true national reconciliation . Accordingly, the change must involve the
abolition of all systems of forced hatred and division that split the nation of
Vietnam for more than half of century.
The combination of a
communist bureaucracy and capitalist economics in Vietnam today, has created
massive social and economic upheaval . The fear of the current leadership in
Vietnam, especially after the VIII Party's Convention, will reverse any further
economic development of Vietnam, placing the whole country on a potential
course of collapse and destruction with no chances of joining the Asian region
in viable economic reform and development.
REFERENCES:
1.- Joyce Barnathan: "Has Red Capitalists
wrecked China".
Business Week, Jan. 13, 1997, p. 18
2.- Đặng Đức Đàm : "Vietnam Economy 1986-1995"; Thế Giới Publishers , Hanoi 1995;
2.- Đặng Đức Đàm : "Vietnam Economy 1986-1995"; Thế Giới Publishers , Hanoi 1995;
ASIA, HC-444; D33; 1995.
3.- Hoàng Lan........: "New Capitalists in
Vietnam", Hawaii New -bimonthly, Dec. 15, 1996,
P.33.
4.- Lê Mạnh Hùng...:"Vietnam Perspectives";
International Conference, Honolulu, HI; Dec.
6 & 7, 1990.
5.- Phạm Trần.........: "The VIII Convention of the Communist Party of Vietnam", Ngày Nay, Vietnamese Newspaper, July 16, 1996, pp. 1, 2 and 4.
6.-Hawaii News Vietnamese bimonthly, April 15, 1996,
pp.31-32.
GHI CHÚ:
Xin đón xem Bài 2: "CHINA
IN THE POST COLD WAR".
(China's
modernization under Deng Xiaoping era)
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